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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to tell the story of one of the most interesting
experiments in the history of the automotive industry—one of the first transplants
of a Japanese auto manufacturer into an American culture. It is the story of New
United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (NUMMI), a Toyota-General Motors (GM)
50:50 joint venture that started in 1984. NUMMI is located in Fremont, Califor-
nia. Fremont is just east of San Fran-
cisco Bay between Oakland to the
north and San Jose to the south.
Although this story has been told
many times and much research has
been done on NUMMI, I believe it is
such a remarkable one that retelling it
anew is worth the effort. Furthermore,
it provides another insight into how the Japanese have dramatically influenced
automobile and other manufacturing in the U.S. In fact I first heard of NUMMI
when I went to work for the Douglas Aircraft Co. (DAC), a part of McDonnell
Douglas1) in 1989.2) As I recall, the executive in charge of implementing DAC’s
then nascent total quality management (TQM) program was hired away from
NUMMI to take advantage of his knowledge in that area.
1) McDonnell Douglas has since merged with the Boeing Co.
2) I remember when I first saw this name thinking “What a strange name for a com-
pany.” Now it doesn’t seem so strange knowing the story of the company.
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This paper is organized as follows:
1. Introduction
2. Why NUMMI?
3. Before NUMMI
4. NUMMI Begins
5. Post-NUMMI Startup
6. Factors Contributing to NUMMI’s Success
7. Some Negatives
8. NUMMI Today
9. Summary and Conclusion
2. Why NUMMI?
NUMMI was an initiative of Toyota. Toyota’s main objectives were to gain
entry to the U.S. market to counter Honda and Nissan, and to ease trade frictions
that had arisen between Japan and the U.S.  Toyota also wanted to learn to work
with an American workforce (Inkpen, 2005, p. 117). Toyota also wished to learn
about American suppliers. According to Adler (1993b) “Toyota’s primary con-
cern with respect to suppliers was to identify potential suppliers and establish
long term relations with them” (p. 185). As far as working with “an American
workforce,” this did not initially include a unionized workforce. As Adler
(1993a) states it: “Toyota later claimed it had also wanted ‘to gain experience
with American union labor,’ but at first Toyota wanted nothing to do with the
UAW3)” (p. 98).
According to Inkpen (p. 117), GM’s primary goal was finding a source for a
small car (to fill a market gap)4) and to utilize an idle plant—the GM-Fremont
3) United Auto Workers, the union that had represented the workers at GM-Fremont, the
plant NUMMI was to use.
4) This turned out to be the Chevrolet Nova, a subcompact.
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plant that had closed in 1982. It should not be surprising that GM was also
was interested in learning about the Toyota Production System (TPS), which was
having such an impact on the American market by producing high-quality cars at
highly competitive prices. However according to Inkpen (p. 117) initially this
interest was, for the most part, only by the then GM Chairman, Roger Smith. It
was only after NUMMI started to significantly outperform GM’s other plants that
GM began to seriously consider a systematic way of transferring TPS knowledge
to GM’s operation, and this didn’t happen until about a decade after NUMMI
came on-line.
3. Before NUMMI
To fully appreciate the difference NUMMI made we have to consider how
things were while the GM-Fremont plant was in operation. This plant opened in
1963 and closed in 1982. According to Adler (1993b, p. 119) employment
peaked in 1978 at 6,800 and then gradually shrank to 5,700 at the time of closing
in 1982. The plant had a notorious reputation. As Adler (1993a) described it:
Productivity was among the lowest of any GM plant, quality was abysmal,
and drug and alcohol abuse were rampant both on and off the job. Absen-
teeism was so high that the plant employed 20% more workers than it
needed just to ensure an adequate labor force on any given day. The United
Auto Workers local earned a national reputation for militancy; from 1963 to
1982, wildcat strikes and sickouts closed the plant four times. The backlog
of unresolved grievances often exceeded 5,000. (p. 98)
Levine, et al. (1995) give us further insight into just how bad things were at
GM-Fremont:
In a troubled company [GM], Fremont was the most troubled plant. Unex-
cused absenteeism often ran more than 20 percent, with levels so high on
some Mondays and Fridays that the assembly line could not start. During
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the three years between [union] contract talks, the accumulation of more
than four thousand unresolved grievances was not unusual.5) Quality levels
and productivity were far below the GM standard which itself was falling
ever further behind the world-class standard being set in Japan. (pp. 12–13)
Industrial relations probably couldn’t have been worse at GM-Fremont. Again,
quoting Levine, et al. (p. 12): “Managers often acted arbitrarily, played favorites,
ignored safety issues, and pushed workers to increase productivity.” If a worker
complained they were simply told to write up a grievance that seldom got
addressed. The union, for its part, was completely confrontational “…defending
all workers against managerial discipline. Even workers who were known to have
stolen goods or to have shown up repeatedly too drunk to work were defended
by the union” (p. 12). And since grievances were almost never resolved,6) things
never got better.
Such was the situation at what has been called “the worst plant in the world.”
We shall have more to say about how things were at GM-Fremont when we dis-
cuss how the situation vastly improved once Toyota took over (section 5).
4. NUMMI Begins7)
The NUMMI story begins in 1980 when Toyota hired a Washington D.C. law
firm to help them find a joint venture partner. Initially Ford was considered but
when this failed GM was approached (Jacobson, 1986, 19–20 as cited in Adler,
1993b). Efforts with GM proved more successful with discussions starting in
early 1980 and an agreement in principle signed in February 1983. Under this
5) Or, perhaps, even more—see previous quote.
6) According to Levin, et al. (p. 12) at contract time management and labor typically
agreed to simply dismiss the backlog of grievances.
7) Most of the information in this section is from Adler, 1993b, pages 117 to 128 includ-
ing associated notes on pages 184 and following. Unless otherwise cited this will be the
reference for quotes.
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agreement two cars would be produced at the old but refurbished GM-Fremont
plant: the new Corolla FX and a new version of the Chevrolet Nova based on the
Corolla Sprinter. Toyota would be responsible for the design and engineering of
both cars and marketing of the FX. GM would be responsible for marketing the
Nova. Toyota would also be responsible for the design and operation of the
refurbished plant.
After what’s been said about the abysmal condition at GM-Fremont it is un-
derstandable why Toyota didn’t want to be involved with the UAW. However,
given the control the UAW exercised over the plant, Toyota gave in and a Letter
of Intent was signed with the union in September 1983. According to Adler
(1993a, p. 99) this letter did the following:
• Recognized the UAW as the sole bargaining agent for the NUMMI labor
force,
• Specified prevailing auto-industry wages and benefits,
• Stipulated that a majority of the work force would be hired from among
the workers laid off from GM-Fremont,8)
• Agreed that the UAW would support implementation of a new production
system, and
• Agreed to the negotiation of a new contract.
In June 1985 a new collective bargaining agreement was signed providing a “full
complement of 15 full-time representatives as well as 67 union coordinators9) in
the plant.”
Perhaps the most important part of this agreement was Toyota’s “no layoff”
policy. Appendix A contains the full statement of this policy in the 1985 agree-
8) According to Levin, et al. (p. 13) of the 1,200 employed when NUMMI production
began (December 1984), 99 percent of the assembly workers and 75 percent of the
skilled trades workers were former GM-Fremont employees/UAW members!
9) Allocated two hours of overtime per week, the coordinators’ job is to resolve prob-
lems through discussions with the workers.
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ment but the key sentence is: “Hence, the Company agrees that it will not layoff
employees unless compelled to do so by sever economic conditions that threaten
the long term viability of the Company.” As it turned out a significant downturn
in sales in 1987 and 1988 sorely tested this policy. At one point the situation was
so bad that there were 264 more production workers than needed. Rather than
consider laying them off, NUMMI assigned them to such things as work on a
new car introduction to take place in 1989, kaizen (improvement) projects, addi-
tional training, and work formerly outsourced such as plant maintenance work.
One serendipitous result of this policy is stated by Mark Hogan, one of the man-
agers interviewed by Adler for his 1993b article: “Team members know that
when they contribute ideas for more effective operations they are not jeopardiz-
ing anyone’s job” (p123). In the past, workers were reluctant to make suggestions
that might improve a job so much the amount of labor could be reduced.
In general Toyota and the union agreed on a close working relationship that
would embody “joint union/management investigation of work problems;
advance consultations on layoffs, schedule changes, and major investments; and
joint union/management review of unusual or mitigating circumstances in
advance of discharges or suspensions” (p. 123).
In February 1984 NUMMI formally came into existence as an independent
California corporation. Under the terms of organization, each partner contributed
$100 million: Toyota in cash and GM, for the most part, the Fremont plant. An
additional $250 million was raised by NUMMI as an independent corporation
(Adler et al., 1998, p. 130). As for personnel, Toyota contributed a core staff of
30 to 35 managers who would stay on for three to five years. Supporting them
was a group of 30 to 60 lower-level managers and engineers who served as train-
ers and rotated out after three months (Adler, 1993b, p. 185). GM, limited by a
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) agreement10) contributed only 16 managers
10) The FTC became involved right from the start due to worries that two of the largest →
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who would rotate back to GM after three years.
In May of 1983, the hiring process commenced and 5,300 applications were
sent to former GM-Fremont workers. Of these 3,200 were returned. During the
next 20 months 2,200 hourly employees were hired along with some 300 salaried
employees. Each applicant, even for a management job, had to pass a three-day
assessment that included “production simulations, individual and group discus-
sions, written tests, and interviews” (p. 120). As per the Letter of Intent, the
union played a significant role in the selection process of both the hourly and
management personnel. Since GM-Fremont had done little hiring in recent years,
NUMMI’s work force was relatively old with an average age of 41. Adler goes
on to say: “Most had a high school education. Some 26% were Hispanic, 20%
black, and 15% female” (p. 120).
All new hires went through a four-day orientation that covered such things as
the production system, quality principles, attendance rules, safety, and house-
keeping. The first 450 Team and Group Leaders11) were set sent to Toyota’s
Takaoka plant12) in Toyota City near Nagoya Japan. There they attended a three-
week classroom and on-the-job training program. These leaders then served as
trainers for the new team members (production
workers).
Production of Novas began in December
1984. Since the Toyota Production System
(TPS) was entirely new to most of these work-
ers the line speed started slowly and was only
gradually increased to allow these new hires 1987 Chevrolet Nova
automakers in the world were combining for the NUMMI venture. The FTC agreement
stipulated that the venture had to be abandoned after 12 years but this requirement was
later rescinded.
11) We will discuss NUMMI’s team and group structure shortly.
12) The Takaoka plant serves as a model for NUMMI (and other similar Toyota plants).
→
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time to master their jobs. In that first month,
December 1984, only 17 Novas were pro-
duced. In 1985 this increased to 64,764. In
1986 Nova production peaked at 191,594. That
same year production of the Corolla FX com-
menced with 14,246 being produced.13)
The NUMMI assembly process consisted of these five steps:
• Stamping of major body parts (hoods, doors, fenders, etc.)
• Welding these parts together for form the body of the car
• Painting the body
• Assembling the rest of the car
• Inspecting
Appendix C from Adler (1993b) shows a more detailed description of this pro-
cess.14)
NUMMI, as any large company, has its management bureaucracy. However,
following the “Toyota Way”,15) NUMMI’s production work force is organized
around a very specific team structure. A team consists of five to seven team
members and a team leader. The leader, like the members, is an hourly
employee. As Adler puts it, the team leader:
…filled in for absent workers; trained new workers; assisted workers hav-
ing difficulty in their jobs; recorded attendance; assigned work when the
line stopped; assisted team members in minor maintenance and house keep-
ing; assessed new team members; led Kaizen efforts; and organized social
events outside the plant. (p. 124)
1987 Corolla FX
13) See Appendix B for a complete list of annual production figures.
14) See Appendix E for an even more detailed and up-to-date description of the produc-
tion process.
15) See Liker (2004) and Austenfeld (2006).
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For this additional responsibility they are paid a little more each hour.  Four
teams make up a group and the Group Leader is the first level of management.
Compensation for production workers was at or above the prevailing national
union rate and included cost of living and shift premiums. Also all hourly work-
ers made the same rate. Bill Childs, one of the general managers interviewed by
Adler (1993b), explained the rationale for this:
There used to be 80 hourly worker classifications with varying pay rates
under the old system. This caused workers to grumble over why one worker
got a 5 cents an hour more than someone else for what looked like equally
strenuous work. We don’t have those kinds of arguments any more. And
that makes a big difference to our productivity. (pp. 125–126)
Furthermore, there were no more seniority, performance, or merit-based bonuses.
Attendance rules were also simplified. At GM-Fremont they were always
arguing about whether an absence was excused or not. Bill Childs explains how
this problem was overcome at NUMMI:
We’ve eliminated the distinction between excused and unexcused absences.
Instead, after three occurrences within a 90-day period, we submit a write-
up [a written warning]—automatically. After three more occurrences within
90 days there’s a write-up and warning; and three more gets you a final
warning. The worker is given counseling after the second and third warnings
in an attempt to help them solve their attendance problems, but after three
more occurrences you’re out.
To round out the picture of the transition from the way GM-Fremont operated
and the  NUMMI/Toyota way Adler mentions three more things: consensus, con-
sistency, and communications. By consensus is meant getting as many opinions
as possible before making a decision, even one that an American manager would
think only involves him or her. The idea is to not only take advantage of the
ideas of others but to head off any resistance to implementation once the deci-
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sion is made since more people will have “ownership” of the decision. This
approach to decision making was especially difficult for American managers to
accept. The Japanese word for this method is ringi-sho.
By consistency is meant managers are to remain constantly faithful to the
company’s stated policies, especially those dealing with employee relations. An
example is given by Carlos Romero, a team member interviewed by Adler
(1993b). He had complained for more than a year to his American management
about an oil drip above his workstation. One day a Japanese visitor came by and
Carlos pointed out the leak to him.
About 1/2 hour later he came back with a few workers to lay down some
canvas to catch the dripping. The next day, more people came by and
blocked the leak with a metal plate, sealing the leak for good. (p. 127)
The third distinguishing feature of the NUMMI culture was communications.
To illustrate this Adler quotes Bill Borton who was the Manager of the Stamping
Department. In this quote Burton describes a typical monthly department meet-
ing involving all the team members:
We first discuss the previous month’s sales of the Nova and FX; next we
discuss plant safety and encourage people to remain vigilant. Then we talk
about quality as reported to us by GM’s quarterly quality control audit. Next
we go into job attendance… Then we’ll discuss the suggestion rate and
report back on the status of employee suggestions. We then give some data
on line performance that month, die change times per sift, scrap, and energy
costs. The remainder of the meeting is opened for general questions… (pp.
127–128)
Having covered how NUMMI got started and to a limited extent what it
looked like initially, we now ask the question what difference did it make, espe-
cially in terms of productivity, quality, and worker morale.
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5. Post-NUMMI Startup
As far as productivity, Figure 1 from Adler shows the results of an “extensive
analysis” of NUMMI’s in 1986, just two years after operations commenced.
NUMMI’s productivity is compared with that of the old GM-Fremont plant
in 1978, with a similar active GM plant—Framingham (MA),16) and with
NUMMI’s sister plant in Japan—Takaoka. Even when corrected for such things
16) This plant has since closed.
Figure 1. NUMMI productivity, quality, and space utilization comparisons (Table 5 in
Adler, 1993b, p. 128)
Note: The figures for Corrected Productivity for GM-Fremont do not add up
correctly. Assuming the “24.2” is correct the total should be 29.1. Given
GM-Fremont’s poor record it is probably much higher.
Framingham  GM-Fremont  NUMMI Takaoka
Uncorrected Productivity
(hrs/unit)
Hourly* 36.1 38.2 17.5 15.5
Salaried 4.6 4.9 3.3 2.5
Total 40.7 43.1 20.8 18.0
Corrected Productivity**
(hrs/unit)
Hourly* 26.2 24.2 16.3 15.5
Salaried 4.6 4.9 3.3 2.5
Total 30.8 48.5 19.6 18.0
Product Quality
(Consumer Report 2.1–3.0 2.6–3.0 3.6–3.8 3.8–4.0
Reliability Index)
Space Utilization
(sq. ft/unit/year) 8.1 7.9 7.0 4.8
Notes: *Excluding stamping, molding, and seat assembly personnel.
**Corrected for number of welds, welding automation, product size,
relief time, and option content.
Source: Krafcik (1986).
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as number of welds and welding automation, NUMMI’s productivity in hours per
unit was not only much better than that of the old GM-Fremont plant but also
much better than a similar GM plant and almost as good as the Takaoka plant
which had been open since 1966. This is particularly impressive given that, on
average NUMMI’s workers were ten years older than those at the Takaoka plant
and much less experienced with the TPS. Not only was NUMMI’s productivity
much better than the Framingham plant, but better than any other GM plant
(Adler, 1993b).
Similar results appear for quality in Figure 1. Again, NUMMI’s quality is
much better than the GM plants and on a par with Takaoka. Adler (1993b) notes
that these Consumer Report figures are confirmed by internal GM data:
“Krafcik17) also cites internal GM quality data on end-of-the-line inspections
(Corporate Quality Audit) and owners surveys (CAMIP18)) that mirror these
results” (p. 129).
Speaking of the improvements in quality over the GM-Fremont plant, Adler
(1993a) quotes a NUMMI team leader who had worked at the old plant:
Before, when I saw a Chevy truck, I’d chuckle to myself and think, “You
deserve that piece of crap if you were stupid enough to buy one.” I was
ashamed to say that I worked at the Fremont plant. But when I was down at
the Monterey Aquarium a few weekends ago, I left my business card—the
grunts even have business cards—on the windshield of a parked Nova with
a note that said, “I helped build this one.” I never felt pride in my job
before. (p. 106)
The third item in Figure 1 is space utilization. This is usually an indication of
quality since one of the earmarks of poor quality is having large in-plant inven-
17) The source of the data in Figure 1.
18) Continuous Automotive Marketing Information Program—a quarterly marketing sur-
vey conducted by an outside firm for GM.
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tories meaning more space is needed. That NUMMI was not that much different
from GM and Takaoka was much better than the others reflects the fact that the
NUMMI plant was still generally configured for the large inventories that existed
in days of the GM-Fremont operation.
Granted that productivity and quality improved, how about employee rela-
tions? Were these any better under a Toyota-run operation? As an indicator of
this we might consider such things as absenteeism, substance abuse, and
employee participation in the suggestion program. Quoting from Adler (1993a)
again:
…absenteeism has dropped from between 20% and 25% at the old GM-Fre-
mont plant to a steady 3% to 4% at NUMMI; substance abuse is a minimal
problem; and participation in the suggestion program has risen steadily from
26% in 1986 to 92% in 1991. (p. 99)
Adler goes on to talk about grievances:
When GM-Fremont closed its doors, it had more than 2,000 grievances out-
standing. As of the end of 1991, some 700 grievances had been filed at
NUMMI altogether over the course of eight years. The overall proportion of
employees describing themselves as “satisfied” or “very satisfied” has risen
progressively to more than 90%. (p. 99, italics added).
From this it is apparent there was a dramatic change in employee relations.
Before there was this constant hostility between management and the union, with
both trying to get the most out of the other. Now, as we shall see further, there is
a spirit of cooperation between the two to “make the best cars.” The following
words of a NUMMI team leader perhaps best describe this remarkable change:
There are people here who will tell you they hate this place. All I say is:
actions speak louder than words. If people were disgruntled, there’s no way
that we’d be building the highest quality vehicle. You wouldn’t have a plant
that’s this clean. You would still have the drug problems we had before.
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You would still have all the yelling and screaming. You can’t force all that.
And try this: go into any of the bathrooms, you’ll see there no graffiti. If
people have a problem with their manager, they don’t have to tell him on
the bathroom wall. They can tell him to his face. And the boss’s first words
will be: “Why?” Something’s happened here at NUMMI. When I was at
GM, I remember a few years ago I got an award from my foreman for com-
ing to work for a full 40 hours in one week. A certificate! At NUMMI, I’ve
had perfect attendance for two years. (Adler, 1993a, p. 101)
There is no question NUMMI was a changed place. Now we will take a closer
look at why this was and continues to this day.
6. Factors Contributing to NUMMI’s Success
Simply put there are three reasons for NUMMI’s success: the Toyota Produc-
tion System (TPS), standardized work processes, and the relationship between
management and labor. Furthermore, there is a close relationship between these
things as will be discussed below.
The Toyota Production System (TPS). The TPS is probably the ultimate exem-
plar of what has come to be known as lean manufacturing. The purpose of lean
manufacturing is to eliminate waste. Waste can manifest itself in many forms
such as over production, defects, motion, transportation, inventory, over process-
ing, and waiting. A good lean manufacturing system strives to eliminate or at
least minimize all forms of waste. For example according to Toyota’s homepage
(Toyota Production System, 2006) the TPS is based on two concepts: jidoka and
just-in-time, both designed to eliminate production line waste. Fundamentally,
jidoka means that quality is built in not, as is too often  the case, “inspected in”
after the fact. In other words to the extent possible the production system is
designed to prevent a defective part or product from continuing along the produc-
tion line. Levine et al. (1995) give an example of a wrench programmed to
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tighten four bolts, if only three get tightened an alarm sounds (p. 15). Jidoka also
is practiced by the team members on the assembly line. Should a problem be
spotted, team members are not only authorized but expected to pull a cord which,
if not pulled again within a minute, will cause the line will stop. Levine, et al.
describes the process:
When the cord is pulled, a musical tune plays and a flashing light on an
overhead board signals where the line pull occurred, alerting the group
leader and team leader. If the cord is not pulled again within a minute, the
line shuts down until the problem is fixed. On average, NUMMI workers
pull the cord abut 150 times per eight-hour shift, and the line is stopped
approximately 20 minutes [total] each shift. (p. 15, emphasis added)
Note that this policy of stopping the line when there’s a problem is not only to
avoid any bad product being produced but also to “fix the problem” if, indeed, it
was something other than a temporary aberration.19) Contrast this with the tradi-
tional approach at a GM factory where workers were not allowed or even able to
stop the line under virtually any circumstances (Levine et al., p. 15). Figure 2
graphically depicts this feature of the TPS.
The other concept upon which the TPS is based is just-in-time (JIT). JIT is a
way to manage inventory so that what is needed for producing something arrives
just when it’s needed. JIT is the opposite of the traditional way of manufacturing
known as “batch and queue.” With batch and queue, large work-in-process inven-
tories of material, parts, components, and even finished goods are created. The
idea is based on the principle of economies of scale: once a machine is setup it
would seem to make sense to make as many parts as possible to reduce the per-
unit cost. The trouble with this is, once produced, these large inventories of parts
and components need to be stored and managed, no small thing in a large manu-
19) In almost all cases, the problem is quickly resolved and the line doesn’t stop.
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facturing operation. JIT, in its purest form, does away with all inventory so that
each operation in the production process receives what it needs from the next
upstream operation “just-in-time.” In reality, some inventory is needed; the trick
is to constantly look at ways to minimize it. For example an integral part of the
TPS is short setup times. By being able to quickly shift from making one part to
another, the need to make a lot at one time goes away.
JIT is based on what’s known as a “pull” system. In other words, instead of
having a lot of inventory to use, each production operation is designed to “pull”
what it needs from the next upstream operation by sending some sort of signal to
it. This is similar to the way supermarkets operate. Instead of having huge inven-
tories on their shelves or in their back rooms, they let the customers “signal”
them what’s needed by monitoring what’s been used from the shelves and then
Figure 2. An assembly line with andon lights and work stoppage buttons (Liker, 2004,
p. 131)
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restocking just what’s needed to bring the shelves back to a certain level.20) The
TPS operates this way, with the signaling being done with kanbans. Excerpting
from Austenfeld (2006):
A kanban is simply some device to signal the next upstream supply
source that more of whatever it supplies is needed. Kanban in Japanese
means card and a card of some sort is usually used along with a standard
size container for that particular item. Figure 3 illustrates the kanban con-
cept. At the far right an operator is using up parts from a standardized con-
tainer. Once those parts are used up, the empty container, along with it
“parts retrieval kanban” goes back to a nearby replenishment store for refill-
ing and return to the operator. Of course while this replenishment is going
on another container21) is in the system to allow the operation to continue.
In turn, as the replenishment store’s stock goes down and reaches a cer-
tain level, a “production instruction kanban” is triggered and sent back to
the producer for producing a certain amount to be sent to the replenishment
store. This is shown on the left side of Figure 3. Of course not all produc-
tion facilities are so close that such precisely timed replenishment can
occur. Therefore some parts must be moved in larger quantities on a sched-
uled basis, for example parts coming from overseas. However, even these
replenishments should be as often as practical to minimize inventory. (pp.
134–136)
Many benefits derive from minimizing inventory. For example, the amount of
capital tied up in inventory is minimized. Furthermore, the costs associated with
20) As the story goes the inspiration for JIT was a visit by Taiichi Ohno, an employee of
Toyota, to an American supermarket in the early 1950s. Ohno is probably the person
most responsible for the development of the TPS.
21) Or however many are needed, but the number should be as small as possible to keep
that inventory down.
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simply storing, maintaining, keeping track of, and moving inventory is greatly
reduced. Also once some change in the product occurs, the problem of a lot of
inventory immediately becoming obsolete and having to be written off is
avoided. However, perhaps one of the biggest advantages in keeping inventory to
a bare minimum is being able to find and fix problems quickly. With a large in-
ventory of parts for example it is natural for a worker to simply grab another one
when he or she finds a bad one. If instead there is only one part available and it
is “bad,” the reason must be determined immediately to prevent bad product from
being produced.
Besides jidoka and JIT, there are several other features to the TPS such as lev-
eling out the workload (heijunka), use of visual controls, error proofing (poka-
yoke), using only thoroughly tested technology, having a culture of stopping to
fix problems to get quality right the first time, and standardized work processes.
See Liker (2004) for complete discussion of these plus the Toyota philosophy in
which these features are embedded (The Toyota Way). See Austenfeld (2006) for
a briefer discussion of The Toyota Way.
Standardized work processes. Although NUMMI, under Toyota control,
adopted all these features of the TPS, the one that seems to get the most atten-
tion in the literature is standardized work processes. The idea of a standardized
work process represents sort of a bridge between the two cultures: Japanese and
American; and it is how each approaches this matter that has become the focus
of so much attention.
A traditional American assembly line is based on pure Taylorism, that is
“experts” in job design develop the “one best way” to do the job and give this to
the worker. As a person22) quoted in Adler (1993b) put it: “In most plants, man-
agement assumes the ‘divine right’ to design jobs as they see fit” (p. 143). That
22) Joel Smith, then UAW West Coast Representative.
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person goes on to explain why this just doesn’t work:
An industrial engineer would shut himself away in an isolated office and
consider how long it took for somebody to twist their wrist and move their
arm in such and such a way, and calculate times from some manual and try
that way to come up with a task design. The IE would take this “properly”
designed job to the foreman. The foreman would nod his head, but then said
“screw you” to the IE’s back and redesigned the task to his own liking.
Then he’d take his task to the worker and said “Do it this way or you’re
out.” The worker would nod but would pull the same trick on the foreman.
In the end, the job got done however the worker could. When the boss
walked by, the worker might pretend to do the job the way the foreman had
told him. Everybody involved knew this was going on but no one cared
enough to do anything bout it. (pp. 143–144, emphasis added)
Two points here: (1) Take this reality and multiply it by the all the tasks
required to build a relatively complicated product like a car and it should not be
surprising that good quality becomes almost impossible. (2) As emphasized in
the preceding quote it is a big game that no one cares to correct be they manage-
ment or labor. In other words, there’s a psychological dimension to the operation
that also must be reflected in the quality of the product and in the fact that things
are not likely to improve!
At NUMMI, after being trained in such things as work analysis and job de-
scription, the team members themselves design the jobs.  Adler (1993a) describes
the process:
Team members begin by timing one another with stopwatches, looking for
the safest, most efficient way to do each task at a sustainable pace. They
pick the best performance, break it down into its fundamental parts, then
explore ways of improving each element. The team then takes the resulting
analyses, compares them with those of the other shift at the same work sta-
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tion, and writes the detailed specifications that become the standard work
definition for everyone on both teams. (p. 103)
Since they are involved in this design process, there is a commitment by every
team member to follow it exactly. And what you have accomplished is at the
heart and soul of good quality: a reduction in variability. And this  “one way” of
doing the job is the best way known at that point in time, another key to good
quality. Adler (1993a) points out some of the other advantages besides increased
quality:
• Safety improves as the job is designed to reduce stress and strain to a
minimum.
• Inventory control becomes easier with a smoother workflow.
• Job rotation is easier since every one learns the “one best way” to do
each job. This also makes any absences easier to accommodate because
any team member including the team leader can easily step in and do any
job.
• Since all team members are, in effect, IEs they can work together to
make adjustments to the line speed should a drop in demand necessitate a
slow-down. Adler states that NUMMI for example “can convert to a new
line speed in four to six weeks” versus what might take GM six months
to a year. In fact, GM-Fremont would not even try to do this but would
simply lay a shift off.
• The work force feels empowered by having control of its own processes
instead of being dictated to by some IE on high. This is perhaps one of
the most important advantages of the workers having ownership of their
job design.
Besides all the advantages of having the workers themselves design their own
jobs, standardized work has far reaching implications for continuous improve-
ment and the creation of a learning organization. Let’s take the example of a
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golfer trying to improve his golf swing. The first requirement is for his swing to
be the same each time; i.e., standardized. Until this happens, it will be virtually
impossible to move to the next step of improvement. The same can be said for
improving a job task: until it is standardized there is no way to make meaningful
changes to it. Imagine the way GM-Fremont operated as described above with
everyone doing the job the way they thought best. If there were any improve-
ments they were surely haphazard at best based on what each person thought, and
probably seldom shared with others.
At NUMMI workers are encouraged to make suggestions for improving their
work processes. According to Adler (1993a) “. . . [NUMMI] workers made more
than 10,000 suggestions in 1991, of which more than 80% were implemented”
(p. 104). Adler also explains why NUMMI’s suggestion program is so success-
ful. With most suggestions programs workers have little knowledge of what hap-
pens to their suggestions and the programs are mostly to screen out dumb ideas.
At NUMMI the program is designed “…to help workers see and understand the
criteria [for judging ideas], evaluators, process, status, and results.” Workers
know that their suggestions will be fairly evaluated and the “bureaucracy” is not
there to turn down all but the very best ideas but to support the worker and aid
him or her in refining and implementing any idea that has potential merit.
Just the act of establishing a standardized work procedure inevitably begins to
reveal weaknesses in the production system that can then be worked on to im-
prove it. Then, as these improvement ideas are implemented and the process stan-
dardized once more, new ways to make even more improvements will surface.
Adler refers to this as the workers “teaching” the system and the system, in turn,
“teaching” the worker:
Continual reiteration of this disciplined process of analysis, standardization,
re-analysis, refinement, and restandardizaion creates an intensely structured
system of continuous improvement. And the salient characteristic of this
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bureaucracy is learning, not coercion. (p. 104, emphasis added)
The relationship between labor and management. As can be seen, contributing
greatly to this favorable climate of empowerment and learning is the relationship
between labor and management. Section 3 of this paper described the, quite
frankly, atrocious conditions at the GM-Fremont plant before Toyota took over:
an openly hostile relationship between labor and management, numerous and
usually ignored grievances, and workers often absent or showing up drunk or on
drugs. There is no question that such a situation could no longer be allowed to
continue if NUMMI was to produce high-quality cars. NUMMI management,
drawing on the way Toyota does things,23) sought to establish a relationship of
trust with the workers. Perhaps one way to express this relationship is as a team
working together towards a common purpose: prosperity for both the company
and its workers. Right from the start NUMMI took steps to foster this team idea.
Quoting from Adler (1993a):
For example, the company tried to undercut the customary we-they divisions
between workers and management by eliminating special parking and eating
facilities for mangers and by introducing an identical dress code—uni-
forms—for everyone. (pp. 100–101)
And as just discussed the management bureaucracy plays an active support
role versus being a coercive force to get the most out of each worker. Figure 4,
from Adler (1999) compares the two approaches. Ironically, the Toyota/NUMMI
approach also seeks to “get the most out of each worker” but in a positive way
that benefits both the company and the worker. It would seem to be a classical
application of Douglas McGregor’s Theory Y.24) Quoting a department manager,
23) In 1962 Toyota signed a Labor-Management Joint Declaration setting forth its com-
mitment to fostering mutual trust between labor and management. See Appendix D for
a relatively current description of this relationship of mutual trust and respect.
24) McGregor believed that most workers really do want to do a good job and will if
managers treat them with respect and do what they can to support them. The opposite  →
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Adler (1993a) sums this up very well:
Our assumption at NUMMI is that people come to work to do a fair day’s
work. There are exceptions, and you would be foolish to ignore them. But
90% of people, if you give them a chance to work smarter and improve their
jobs, and if they find that by doing that they have created free time for
themselves, will spontaneously look for new things to do. I’ve got hundreds
of examples. (p. 100)
As has already been mentioned the “no layoff” policy also contributes this
feeling that the workers are part of a “team,” not just some expendable resource.
Liker (2004) quotes a manager, Dennis Cuneo, who lived through those early
days of NUMMI and saw the good effects of this policy:
We built trust early on with our team members, GM had problems selling
the Nova in 1987 to ’88 and they substantially cut the orders to our plant.
We had to reduce production and were running at about 75 percent capac-
 (coercive) style of management he termed “Theory X.”
 →
Figure 4. Comparing coercive systems/procedures with enabling ones (Table 2 in Adler,
1999, p. 44)
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ity, but we didn’t lay anybody off. We put people on kaizen teams and
found other useful task for them. Of all the things we did at NUMMI, that
did the most to establish trust. (p. 75, emphasis added)
Compare that with GM-Fremont (a NUMMI team member):
I’ll never forget when I was first hired by GM many years ago. The person-
nel manager who hired us got the…workers who were starting that day into
a room and explained: “You new employees have been hired in the same
way we requisition sandpaper. We’ll put you back on the street whenever
you aren’t needed any more.” (quoted in Adler, 1993a, p. 100)
The ties Toyota forged with the UAW also have contributed greatly to this
idea of everyone in NUMMI being part of a team effort. This relationship with
the UAW has already been discussed in section 4 above. However as an indica-
tion of how NUMMI put it’s “money where its mouth was,” Adler (1993a) re-
lates this very telling story: (see p.106).
. . .when the plant first began operations, the new NUMMI managers
responded quickly to requests from the workers and union representative for
items like new gloves and floor mats, which surprised workers used to see-
ing requests like these turn into battles over management prerogative.
After a few months of getting everything they asked for, workers and
union representatives started trying to think of ways to reciprocate. Eventu-
ally, they decided that chrome water fountains were unnecessary and told
management they’d found some plastic ones for half the price. A few weeks
later, management upped the ante one more time by giving work teams their
own accounts so they could order supplies for team members without prior
approval from management. This kind of behavior led workers to conclude
that they did indeed share common goals with management.
To sum up then, the factors that most contributed to NUMMI’s success were
the Toyota Production System (TPS), standardized work processes developed by
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the workers with the help of management, and a “team” relationship between
labor and management—all absent from the GM-Fremont operation. Although
the impression to this point might be that everything was “peaches and cream” at
NUMMI, there were some negatives. I’ll discuss three.
7. Some Negatives
Dissension within the union. Initially there was strong unity within the UAW
local representing the workers, Local 2244. In fact the first contract was endorsed
by 92 percent of the workers (Adler, et al., 1998, p. 146). However within a
couple of years dissatisfaction with the union’s dominant Administrative Caucus
brought about the formation of the People’s Caucus. The People’s Caucus felt
that the Administrative Caucus was “too ‘cosy’ with management and had not
done enough to protect workers’ rights in cases such as injuries, transfers, or
over-loaded jobs” (Adler, et al.). Over the next several years there was this con-
stant tussle between the two caucuses to the point that “many union committees
were not functioning, and long standing members were bitter about the high level
of acrimony at union meeting.” The basic problem was that neither caucus had a
compelling vision for how it would represent the workers in this new environ-
ment of labor and management working together. The Administrative Caucus
simply wanted the workers to trust them when, in fact, it was important, accord-
ing to Adler, et al., for the union to bring the workers into fuller participation
concerning its dealing with the NUMMI management. This “trust me” attitude
led many of the workers to the feeling that the Administrative Caucus was not
doing enough to represent their interests. As quoted in Adler, et al., one veteran
worker expressed it in these terms:
I don’t want the type of union muscle we used to have. You could get away
with almost anything in the old plant, because the union would get you off
the hook. It was really crazy, but it wasn’t productive. I still want a union
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that’s honest and that can help the people that really need it. But we’ve
never seen the Administrative Caucus really stop management with that
‘Hey, wait a minute!’ Maybe they did do it, but if they did, it must have
been behind closed doors, because we never saw it. (p. 147)
Unfortunately the People’s Caucus too failed to develop a definitive way for
taking advantage of the new cooperation between labor and management at
NUMMI; the same worker continues: “The People’s Caucus is also a mixed bag.
I’ve got family and friends on both sides.”
Despite all this dissension within the union, according to Adler, et al. (1998),
cooperation between NUMMI management and the workers was not seriously
affected:
[Union and management] continued to discuss normal union-management
issues such as penalties for absences. There was no radical shift in the
union’s strategic posture nor in its ability to cooperate with management on
issues of common concern. And in 1997, the Administrative Caucus was
voted back in. (p. 155)
But that is not to say there were no complaints about working conditions. Per-
haps the best example of this was the ergonomics25) problem NUMMI faced in
the 1990s, the second negative I want to discuss.
The ergonomics problem. According to Adler, et al. (1998) the ergonomics
problem came to a head with a major model changeover in 1993.26) Prior to this
NUMMI’s record as far as health and safety was far from impressive and in strik-
ing contrast to its achievements in the areas of quality and productivity. Adler, et
al. cites three policy reasons for this: (1) a lack of ergonomics expertise, (2) a job
25) The study of how a workplace and the equipment used there can best be designed for
comfort, safety, efficiency, and productivity.
26) Beginning with this changeover two models would be built on the same assembly
line: the Toyota Corolla and the Chevrolet Prizm.
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rotation policy that was not designed to reduce stress by moving workers from
more to less stressful jobs, and (3) an ergonomics evaluation methodology that
failed to take into adequate consideration certain potential stress areas such as
vibration (p. 149). Besides these policy reasons another factor contributing to the
problem of poor ergonomics was a view by management that many “injuries”
were being faked by workers trying to “game” the system. Also those most
responsible for monitoring such problems, the assistant managers and group lead-
ers, were more preoccupied with quality and productivity as this was the message
they were getting from higher management. In general, there was little real inter-
est in ergonomics on management’s part. And even the union had only one health
and safety representative and that person was fully occupied with safety issues.
Adler et al. describes how the 1993 model changeover exacerbated the ergo-
nomics problem. A pilot team was assembled more than two years before the
August 1992 production start date. This would seem to be enough time to iron
out all the problems associated with bringing a new model on line. In fact, the
new Corolla had already begun production in 1991 at NUMMI’s sister Takaoka
plant. This gave the pilot team an advantage in that many bugs had already been
worked out of the production process. Despite all this, when the changeover to
the new models took place and production restarted in August, many serious
quality and workability problems arose. As described by Adler, et al.:
Many parts of the new car simply did not fit together: Gaps formed between
pieces of the interior, and cars rattled when they were driven. Even when the
parts did fit, the ease with which they could be assembled—workability—
was often seriously deficient. (p. 152)
This was attributed to these factors: (1) the shift from Japanese suppliers to U.S.
suppliers causing 36 new suppliers to added to the supplier base, (2) parts that
had been altered in Japan but whose drawing had not been updated, and (3) the
relative inexperience of the pilot team—only two of its 34 members had prior
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major model change experience (p. 152).
The result was not only serious quality problems but also an increase in the
number work-related injuries and illnesses. To make matters worse, due to work-
ers not being fully trained on more than their primary job, job rotation, which
might have helped alleviate the problem, became impossible. Gary Convis, then
NUMMI’s Vice-President for Manufacturing and Engineering, points out in
Adler, et al. how this caused a vicious circle: when a worker had to be absent due
to an injury it meant the team leader had to fill in instead of substituting for an-
other worker to let him or her get trained in a secondary job. Thus, without any
rotation, a team member might have to continue to work at an extremely stress-
ful job for long periods and him or herself become a victim of ergonomic stress
(pp. 152–153).
As conditions continued to deteriorate, the union appealed to the California
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (Cal-OSHA) in October 1992.
After a visit to the plant the OSHA representative was not impressed with what
NUMMI was doing to solve the problem. According to Adler et al., NUMMI was
focused on the root cause which was poorly designed parts and work procedures,
not immediate solutions. As a result, NUMMI was cited for an “alarming”
increase in “serious employee injuries due to repetitive stress.” Additionally these
problems were to take their toll on labor-management relations, Although some
workers saw the problems as to be expected, many felt NUMMI management
was letting them down. In fact the previously mentioned discord within the union
was contributed to by these problems: in 1994 the more “militant” People’s Cau-
cus won all major union offices except that of the President from the Adminis-
trative Caucus.
Eventually NUMMI cleaned up its act with the launch of the 1995 launch
285T (Tacoma) truck in 1995. In fact, it would appear NUMMI learned a lot
from its problems with the 1993 changeover:
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Unlike the 1993 Pilot Team members, the 285T Pilot Team members were
given extensive ergonomics training. Toyota and NUMMI engineers worked
with the Pilot Team to make the 285T easier to assembly than its predeces-
sors. NUMMI’s quality department put more emphasis on workability issue
than in the 1993 case, spending a lot of time analysing parts before and
after each pilot. The quality department also established better communica-
tions with suppliers, and suppliers in turn were able to respond more rapidly
to design changes. (Adler et al., pp. 153–154)
Furthermore, unlike the Corolla/Prizm changeover, NUMMI made it a policy that
all team members would rotate between at least two jobs from the time of the
very first vehicle.
Losing the “TPS” edge. One other example to show that things weren’t always
“perfect” at NUMMI was another “launch” problem in 2002 when NUMMI was
changing over to a new model of the Corolla.
NUMMI had hired nearly 1,000 new people to help build the new model,
but the launch did not go as smoothly as expected. The “tribal knowledge”
about lean manufacturing had not been passed down to the new workers,
and even some veterans needed a refresher course. (NUMMI Plant a
Model…, 2006)
Apparently this caused Toyota to realize that there was a need to reemphasize
TPS at NUMMI. Accordingly they brought in a former manufacturing executive
from Ford Motor Co., Ernesto Gonzalez-Beltran, to be Vice President, Manufac-
turing in 2002.27) According to Gonzalez-Beltran as quoted in Waurzyniak
(2005):
27) This surprised me since one of Liker’s (2004) 14 “principles” of the Toyota Way is
to grow your leaders from within. Perhaps this is a reflection of the hybrid nature  of
NUMMI being part Japanese and part American. For American companies bringing an
outsider in to “turn things around” is fairly common.
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When I came over, the big challenge that I was given was how do we
regain the level of TPS that we had at the beginning, because, according to
the management, there had been an erosion of knowledge in TPS and
knowledge of application over the years.
Gonzalez-Beltran attributes the high acceptance of TPS at NUMMI’s begin-
ning to a couple of factors: the workers’ “appreciation for having a job” having
been laid off from the old GM plant and, maybe especially, the improved work-
ing conditions that came with the TPS way of doing things. He goes on to say:
They were desperate for the change. The traditional combative or antagonis-
tic relationship between union and management was something they didn’t
want to go through again, so they embraced the new concept of working
together, mutual trust and respect, and the level of involvement in the
Toyota Production System that was required from them.
The Waurzyniak article goes on to discuss some of the ways Gonzalez-Beltran
is carrying out his mandate, in particular the renewed emphasis on training as
evidenced by the soon to be completed all-new training building where, accord-
ing the Waurzyniak, “TPS training annually for every one of the 4,800 members
working at the plant” will take place. Other things NUMMI is doing to enhance
its TPS knowledge are having its team members work on jishuken projects and
carrying on a regular exchange of best-practice information among NUMMI’s
sister plant in Japan, Takaoka, and the other Toyota plants in North America. A
jishuken project, apparently much like a kaizen team event, is to “emphasize
learning a specific skill or project-solving in a short time of a week or less”
(Waurzyniak). The information exchange is part of the North American Produc-
tion Joint Meeting (NAPJM) program and member plants have representatives
meet every fourth month in a different location. According to Gonzalez-Beltran
“The whole concept is to not only share each others’ results, as well as the
actual condition of the plant, but also an opportunity to share best practices.” He
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The Toyota Tacoma
The Toyota Corolla
also notes, referring to the TPS, that “…there is always something new. There’s
always something changing.”
8. NUMMI Today
The purpose of this section is to give the reader a feel for NUMMI as it exists
and operates today. It is broken down into two parts: facts about NUMMI and a
very simplified description of the production process (factory tour).
The Pontiac Vibe
28) Unless otherwise stated all “facts” are from the NUMMI Web pages at http://
www.nummi.com as of October 2006.
NUMMI facts28)
• Products:
―――――――――――――
� Toyota Corolla: The first
Toyota Corolla FX16 was
produced at NUMMI in Sep-
tember 1986. The last FX16
was produced in September
1988. That same month,
NUMMI began producing the
Toyota Corolla four-door
sedan
�
――――――――――――――――
Toyota Tacoma truck: NUMMI
builds 17 models of the
award-winning Tacoma, in-
cluding a PreRunner Double
Cab, 4×4 Double Cab, 4×2
Xtracab, PreRunner Xtracab,
4×4 Xtracab, S-Runner, 4×2
Regular Cab, PreRunner
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Regular Cab and 4×4 Regular Cab.
―――――――――――
� Pontiac Vibe: The Vibe is a unique vehicle that combines the best of a
sports car, sport wagon and SUV. It features an athletic, clean look to
the outside and a driver-oriented cockpit inside. Standard goodies in-
clude an AM/FM radio with CD player, roof rack and a 110-volt
household-style electric outlet.
• Facility size:
� Plant: 5.3 million square feet (492,400 square meters).
� Property: Approximately 380 acres (153.8 hectares).
• Annual volume:
� Cars: Approximately 250,000.
� Trucks: Approximately 170,000.
• Employment:
� Represented by UAW Local 2244: Approximately 4,550.
� Salaried: Approximately 890.
� Total: Approximately 5,440.
• Economic impact:
� North American suppliers: Approximately 3,600 (1,000+ in California).
� Total number of jobs supported by NUMMI: Approximately 50,000!
• Major operations: The major operations are stamping, plastics, body and
weld, paint, and assembly. See Appendix E for a brief description of each
of these operations adapted from NUMMI’s Web pages.
• Environment and Corporate Citizenship: Although NUMMI prides itself
on quality, it also is proud of its record on the environment and corporate
citizenship as evidenced by the many awards it has received. See the last
two categories of Appendix F, NUMMI Awards—Environmental
Achievement and Corporate Citizenship. Note that since 1989 NUMMI
has been recognized every year at least once and usually more than once
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A stamping press
29) Adapted from an article posted to a NUMMI Web page (http://www.nummi.com/
web_tour.html) by InsideLine.com, an automotive research company. All pictures are
from NUMMI’s Web pages.
for its contributions to the environment.
A factory tour29)
――――
Note: To see an excellent slide show of how NUMMI builds its Tacoma
trucks go to the NUMMI homepage (http://www.nummi.com), under
“home” click on “cyber tour,” then click on “View the article and
slideshow” near the top of that page. Finally click on “PHOTO
ALBUM: 2005 Toyota Tacoma Factory Tour.”
Stamping
• NUMMI cars and trucks begin as giant rolls of coiled steel, 100% of
which come from the Midwest. These coils weigh 20,000 pounds or
more. Every day NUMMI uses over a million pounds of steel to manu-
facture its vehicles.
• Sheets of metal pass through
stamping presses which use dif-
ferent dies and molds to form
three-dimensional parts. The
dies weigh 40–60,000 pounds
each.
Body and Weld
• We have a large robot welding line that uses over 50 robots to weld outer
bodies together.
• Throughout NUMMI we have 496 robots, 25 different types.
• The number of welds per vehicle are:
� Corolla: 3,694
� Vibe: 4,001
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� Tacoma 2 door: 1,638
� Tacoma extended cab: 1,811
� Tacoma 4 door: 1,925
Paint
• Inspection is the key in the
Paint department. Vehicles are
repeatedly checked throughout
the entire paint process.
• When the vehicle comes out of
Body and Weld it may have
dirt, dust and grease on it. It
goes through a 12-step cleaning
process and then a phosphate
bath that roughens the surface
Body and Weld shop worker
Paint shop worker
to make paint adhere better.
• That’s followed by what’s known as an Elpo bath, which prevents rust
and corrosion and adds an electrical charge that helps paint bond better.
• Next, sealer is applied to all seams for waterproofing and noise reduction.
Asphalt sheets are applied inside the vehicle to reduce road and engine
noise.
• Then robots prime and paint the vehicle—edges and door jambs are done
by hand, and robots finish the job.
• The vehicle is oven cured at four stages—after cleaning, after sealing,
after priming, and after painting.
• Finally, a team member inspects everything to ensure quality.
• Total time in the paint process is about 11 hours.
Plastics
• Plastics supplies the assembly lines with bumpers, instrument panels and
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numerous small parts.
• Small plastic pellets are melted
then inserted into molds in a
process called injection mold-
ing. Using cooling lines, the
plastic solidifies to make the
finished product.
• Then, the mold is separated,
and the part is gently removed
(it’s easily scratched at this
time) and sent to Paint.
Assembly
• After Paint, the first step in As-
sembly is to detach the doors,
Plastics shop worker
Happy Assembly workers
making it easier for team members to work on the vehicle as it travels
down the line. The door is finished in another area of the plant. Toward
the end of the line, the door meets up with the body and is reattached.
• Other steps in the Assembly process include installation of parts such
as…
� engines
� tires
� seats
Quality Control
• Quality isn’t something we only check for at the end of the process; it is
built into NUMMI cars and trucks at each stage. Our Quality Control and
Quality Assurance departments conduct inspections, tests and audits to
ensure customer satisfaction.
• They also work with all areas of the plant to address and prevent prob-
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lems and to increase awareness of the importance of maintaining quality
in each work station.
• The end result is a quality vehicle that finds its way to a General Motors
or Toyota dealer and, eventually, the customer.
Finally, an article that describes a recent look at NUMMI30) is summarized
in Appendix G. These eighteen points give a further insight into “NUMMI
today.”
9. Summary and Conclusion
This purpose of this paper has been to tell the story of one of the most inter-
esting events in the history of the automobile industry: the transplantation of the
Japanese way of making cars into an American setting. NUMMI was (and is) a
Toyota initiative with these objectives: (1) to reduce trade frictions between
Japan and the U.S., (2) to defend against moves by Japanese competitors who
were then beginning to enter the U.S. market, and (3) to learn about operating in
a U.S. environment. It is probably safe to say that NUMMI achieved all of these
objectives. But beyond that surely there must have been an underlying one of
wanting to see if the TPS could be transplanted into an American setting. And
not just any American setting but, once it became inevitable, a unionized one.
And not just any union but probably one of the most militant in the country:
UAW Local 2244.
It is to Toyota’s credit that it not only accomplished the integration of TPS into
this unionized setting (most of its initial workforce were former UAW members),
but soon reached world-class levels of quality and productivity. In fact, as can be
seen from Appendix F, NUMMI has over the years of its existence consistently
received awards for quality. Therefore, I think it is safe to say the “experiment”
was a success. The question is why has this experiment been so successful? To
sum it up, probably for two main reasons: (1) the TPS, especially with its em-
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phasis on standardized work, and (2) Toyota approach to management-labor re-
lations, one built on the principle of mutual trust and respect. As this paper has
pointed out in section 7, the latter has not been without its ups and downs but
overall it appears to have been a successful approach for achieving employee in-
volvement in continuous improvement and organizational learning—hallmarks of
Toyota’s way of doing business (see Liker’s 2004 book The Toyota Way).
So as not to paint too rosy a picture, Adler, et al. (1998) sums things up this
way:
For our part we conclude that NUMMI was not a stunning success which
dominated its competitors on all counts, but nor was it a stunning failure—
and this, in itself, was remarkable enough. NUMMI demonstrated that
unionized American workers cold achieve levels of productivity and quality
very close to the constantly advancing standards set in Japan—a result that
skeptics doubted was possible when NUMMI opened its doors. However,
NUMMI did not set a global standard for performance: Japanese plants
maintained their lead in the technical dimension. Nor did NUMMI set a new
global standard for industrial relations: Saturn in the USA and at other
plants in Europe created more collaborative and effective partnerships which
were more advanced in the social dimension. But NUMMI was remarkable
in its unrivaled combination of excellent performance and innovative indus-
trial relations. (p. 158)
A final remark seems in order regarding NUMMI’s impact on American indus-
try. As mentioned early on in this paper, GM eventually did avail itself of learn-
ing from NUUMI and this is now reflected in the higher quality of its products.
But beyond that, NUMMI has become sort of a showplace for the TPS and
Toyota’s way of labor-management relations. Numerous people from all sorts of
companies have toured (and studied) NUMMI to learn the “Toyota secret of suc-
cess.” Surely this must have had—and continues to have—a major impact on
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improving quality in America and, in fact, could be the real significance of this
great experiment!
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Appendix A
NUMMI’s No-Layoff Policy
(As stated in its collective bargaining agreement of 1985, italics added)
New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. recognizes that job security is es-
sential to an employee’s well being and acknowledges that it has a responsi-
bility, with the cooperation of the Union, to provide stable employment to
its workers. The Union’s commitments in Article II of this Agreement are a
significant step towards the realization of stable employment. Hence, the
Company agrees that it will not layoff employees unless compelled to do so
by severe economic conditions that threaten the long term viability of the
Company. The Company will take affirmative measures before laying off
any employees, including such measures as the reduction of salaries of its
officers and management, assigning previously subcontracted work to bar-
gaining unit employees capable of performing this work, seeking voluntary
layoffs, and other cost saving measures.
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Appendix B
NUMMI’s Annual Production Figures
(Source: NUMMI’s Web pages, Quick Facts, 2006)
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Note: Chevrolet dropped the Geo nameplate with its 1998 lineup. The Geo Prizm is now
called Chevrolet Prizm.
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Appendix C
NUMMI Assembly Process Circa 1987
(Adler, 1993b, p. 121)
1. Stamping Plant
• rolled steel
• 26 presses between 400 tons and 2600 tons
• stamp 35 major body panels—hoods, doors, fenders
2. Body Shop
• various metal parts and panels are welded together
• 170 robots
• approximately 3800 welds used to form each body
• each body checked for defects in metal or welds
3. Paint Shop
• coating
• sealing
• painted—9 different colors with 4 combinations of 2-tone paint available
• oven dried
4. Assembly
• final assembly line is 1.3 miles long
• most of the 2000 parts added as body travels along line
5. Inspection
Adler’s source: Presentation by M. Hogan*, Stanford University, December 4,
1987
*Mark Hogan, then Manager, General Affairs and Comptroller for NUMMI.
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Appendix D
Mutual Trust Between Labor and Management
(Toyota Environmental & Social Report 2003, under Social and
Economic Aspects, Employees)
The basic concepts of mutual trust between labor and management are: improvements in
the lives of employees are realized through the prosperity of the company, and labor and
management thus share the same goal of company prosperity as a common value; manage-
ment will take into consideration to the greatest possible extent stable employment and will
continuously strive to improve working conditions; and employees will cooperate with the
company’s policies in order to promote the company’s prosperity.
In the Labor and Management Resolutions for the 21st Century signed by
labor and management representatives in 1996, mutual respect was added to
mutual trust as a foundation of labor-management relations, and this is reflected in the cur-
rent Guiding Principles at Toyota Motor Corporation. (Below is Toyota’s view of the “mu-
tual trust between labor and management.”)
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Stamping
Each weekday nearly one million pounds of steel are trucked in and transformed
into 121 different parts for the Tacoma, Corolla and Vibe.
Plastics
NUMMI’s Plastics department manufactures instrument panels, bumpers and
other plastic parts for the Vibe, Corolla and Tacoma.
Body and Weld
• Stamping manufactures more than 100 individual parts for our vehicles.
Body and Weld uses those parts, along with others provided by vendors, to
construct the metal shells of our vehicles before sending them on to Paint.
• More than 90 percent of welds are done by machines.
• NUMMI uses two kinds of machines for this automated task: multiwelders
and robots.
• A multiwelder is a large, stand-alone piece of equipment that typically per-
forms dozens of welds at one time. Usually, a team member will load sev-
eral metal parts into it, push a button, and let the machine complete the task.
• NUMMI’s robots look more like the type of machines you see in science fic-
tion movies. They are more humanlike and zip around performing a series of
single welds.
Paint
• Paint takes over where Body and Weld leaves off, and like any paint job, the
Appendix E (page 1 of 4)
Brief Descriptions of NUMMI’s Major Operations
(Adapted from: http://www.nummi.com/manu_process.html, retrieved
October 2006)
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bulk of the work is in the preparation. Vehicles first go through a phosphate
bath to remove dirt and oil. Then, a rust-prevention coating is applied and
the vehicle is baked in a huge oven at 320°F for 20 minutes.
• Sealer and two more coatings are added to muffle sound, prevent chips and
waterproof the vehicle. This is followed by a second trip to the oven, this
time for 10 minutes at 230°F.
• Primer and interior paint come next. Interiors, trunk and engine compart-
ments are sprayed manually, while exterior paint is applied by robots. After
team members inspect and sand vehicles to remove any defects, they are
washed, blow dried and baked at 250°F for 10 minutes.
• Finally we get to the colorful part of the work. A base coat and—for all col-
ors except white—clear coat are applied. Again, team members paint the in-
teriors while robots spray the exteriors. Then it’s back to the oven for an-
other 45 minutes.
• This is followed by another inspection for defects and any repairs that might
be necessary.
Assembly, car
• This department builds about 400 cars per shift, or one every 60 seconds.
• When a car body leaves Paint, it first passes through an inspection station
where team members make certain the paint job is flawless before accepting
the vehicle. The doors are removed to make it easier to move in and around
the car during assembly and to prevent dents and scratches.
• The vehicle proceeds through a series of Trim workstations where team
members begin by installing weather stripping, moldings and pads. Then
Appendix E (page 2 of 4)
Brief Descriptions of NUMMI’s Major Operations (continued)
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they put in wiring, vents and lights.
• After an instrument panel, windows, steering column and bumper supports
are added, it starts to look less like a shell and more like a car. A rear axle,
assembled in another area of the plant comes next.
• Trim finishes up by attaching items such as the emergency brake, gearshift,
speakers and radiator.
• After a 28-point quality assurance check, it’s on to the Chassis line. This is
where many safety-related items are installed. Things like brake lines, gas
tanks and power steering are double-checked by electronic fail-safe devices
known as poka-yokes.
• The engine is installed, along with the starter and alternator. Then come sus-
pension and exhaust systems.
• From there the vehicle enters the Final line, which covers many interior items
such as the console, seats, carpet, glove box and steering wheel. This is also
where bumpers, tires and the battery are added, as well as finishing touches
like covers and vents.
• Finally the doors—which have been traveling down a separate line receiving
trim, wiring, panels, handles, locks and windows—are reattached. The doors
are adjusted to fit properly, all of the connections and fluids are checked, and
the body side moldings are added.
• At this point, the vehicle has spent about 6.5 hours traveling through over
200 workstations in Assembly. Now it will be handed off to Quality Control
for a final check before it’s shipped out to its new owner.
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Brief Descriptions of NUMMI’s Major Operations (continued)
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Assembly, truck
• Because trucks are more complex, truck assembly is different from car as-
sembly. The car is all one piece (unibody), but the truck has separate parts:
the frame, cab and deck, along with variations in each of those parts.
• The truck assembly line is about a half a mile long. At full capacity, NUMMI
produces over 300 trucks per shift, or one every 85 seconds. Only stamp
parts for the cab are stamped at NUMMI.  Frames are delivered every hour
from Stockton [California] and beds come daily from Baja, California
[Mexico]. The beds come pre-assembled and pre-painted and are sent to as-
sembly in the proper color sequence to be added to a matching cab.
Appendix E (page 4 of 4)
Brief Descriptions of NUMMI’s Major Operations (continued)
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Appendix F (page 1 of 4)
NUMMI’s Awards
(http://www.nummi.com/awards.html#top, retrieved October 2006)
Product Quality
Corolla
1993: J. D. Power and Associates’ New Car Initial Quality Study: Among the Top 10
Models in Initial Quality
1998: American Automobile Association: Top Car under $15,000
1999: American Automobile Association: Top Car under $15,000
1999: J. D. Power and Associates’ Initial Quality Study: Best Compact Car in North
America
1999: R. L. Polk and Co.: Four-door Compact Leader
1999: IntelliChoice Complete Car Cost Guide: Best Overall Value in Compact Class
2000: R. L. Polk and Co. Four-door Compact Leader
2000: The Corolla has also ranked as Consumer Digest’s “Best Buy” two years in a row.
2000: J. D. Power and Associates’ Initial Quality Study: Best Compact Car in North
America
2001: R. L. Polk and Co.: Four-door Compact Leader
2001: The Corolla has also ranked as Consumer Digest’s “Best Buy” two years in a row.
2001: J. D. Power and Associates’ Initial Quality Study: Best Compact Car in North
America
2002: J. D. Power and Associates’ Initial Quality Study: Best Compact Car in North and
South America
2004: J. D. Power and Associates’ Initial Quality Study: Best Compact Car in North and
South America
2006: J. D. Power and Associates’ Initial Quality Study: Best Compact Car in North and
South America
Toyota Truck (Hilux)
1992: J. D. Power and Associates’ Initial Quality Study: Best Compact Pickup in Initial
Quality
1993: J. D. Power and Associates’ Initial Quality Study: Best Compact Pickup in Initial
Quality
1995: J. D. Power and Associates’ Initial Quality Study: Best Compact Pickup in Initial
Quality in North America
Tacoma
1996: J. D. Power and Associates’ Initial Quality Study: Best Compact Pickup in Initial
Quality in North America
1997: J. D. Power and Associates’ Initial Quality Study: Best Compact Pickup in Initial
Quality in North America
2001: Four Wheeler magazine: Ultimate 4×4 (Tacoma with TRD package)
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Appendix F (page 2 of 4)
NUMMI’s Awards (continued)
2001: The Toyota Tacoma tied for first place as the “Most Appealing Compact Pickup” in
the 2001 J. D. Power and Associates’ APEAL study. The study ranks Automotive
Performance, Execution and Layout (APEAL).
2002: J. D. Power and Associates’ Initial Quality Study: Best Compact Pickup in Initial
Quality in North America
2004: Motor Trend: Truck of the Year.
2004: Automobile magazine: 2005 All-star Pickup
Prizm
1994: J. D. Power and Associates’ Initial Quality Study: Best Model in the $13,000 to
$17,000 Price Class in Initial Quality
1994: J. D. Power & Associates’ Initial Quality Study: Among the Top Ten Models in Ini-
tial Quality
1995: J. D. Power and Associates’ Initial Quality Study: Best Model in the $12,000 to
$17,000 Price Class in Initial Quality
1995: J. D. Power & Associates’ Initial Quality Study: Among the Top Ten Models in Ini-
tial Quality
2000: According to owner surveys for the 1998 through 2000 model years, nine out of 10
Prizm owners would recommend Prizm to a friend.
Vibe
2001: Autoweek Editors Choice Award
2001: Autoweek’s Best of the Best – Most significant new vehicle runner up
Plant Awards
1994: J. D. Power and Associates’ North American Plant Quality: Silver Plant award (tie)
1995: J. D. Power and Associates’ North American Plant Quality: Bronze Plant award
1996: J. D. Power and Associates’ North American Plant Quality: Bronze Plant award
1999: J. D. Power and Associates’ North American Plant Quality: Silver Plant award
2000: J. D. Power and Associates’ North American Plant Quality: Silver Plant award
2000: J. D. Power and Associates’ Chairman’s Award for Quality.
2000: NUMMI was the first manufacturing plant ever to receive the Chairman’s Award.
2002: J. D. Power and Associates’ North and South American Plant Quality: Bronze Plant
award (tie)
Environmental Achievements
1989: California Water Pollution Control Association’s Treatment Plant of the Year
1990: Bay Area Earth Day Committee’s Northern California Environmental Achievement
in Business Award
1991: Metropolitan Transit Commission’s Special Recognition for Rideshare Program
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Appendix F (page 3 of 4)
NUMMI’s Awards (continued)
1991: RIDES for Bay Area Commuters’ “Best New Rideshare Program” 1991: Union
Sanitary District’s Certificate of Merit
1992: Bay Area Air Quality Management District’s Clean Air Champion Award
1992: California Water Policy Conference: Innovative Water Conservation Award
1992: PG&E’s Energy Efficient Award
1993: RIDES for Bay Area Commuters: One of “Best 100 Employers in Bay Area”
1993: Association of California Water Agencies’ California Water Awareness Award
1993: California Water Pollution Control Association: Northern California Plant of the
Year
1993: California Integrated Waste Management Board’s Waste Reduction Awards Pro-
gram
1994: California Water Pollution Control Association’s Company of the Year (Large
Industry/Northern California)
1994: California Integrated Waste Management Board’s Waste Reduction Awards Pro-
gram
1995: California Water Pollution Control Association’s Company of the Year (Large
Industry/Northern California)
1995: California Integrated Waste Management Board’s Waste Reduction Awards Pro-
gram
1996: California Integrated Waste Management Board’s Waste Reduction Awards Pro-
gram
1996: Peninsula Conservation Center Foundation’s Business Environmental Award for
Resource Conservation
1996: Union Sanitary District’s Certificate of Merit for Continuous Compliance
1997: California Integrated Waste Management Board’s Waste Reduction Awards Pro-
gram
1997: Union Sanitary District’s Certificate of Merit for Continuous Compliance
1998: California Integrated Waste Management Board’s Waste Reduction Awards Pro-
gram
1998: DNV Certification Inc. Environment Management System Certification (ISO
14001)
1999: California Integrated Waste Management Board’s Waste Reduction Awards Pro-
gram
2000: California Integrated Waste Management Board’s Waste Reduction Awards Pro-
gram
2000: Union Sanitary District’s Certificate of Merit for Continuous Compliance
2001: California Integrated Waste Management Board’s Waste Reduction Awards Pro-
gram
2001: DNV Certification Inc. Environment Management System Certification (ISO
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14001)
2001: Spare the Air’s Employer Impact Award
2002: California Integrated Waste Management Board’s Waste Reduction Awards pro-
gram
2002: Union Sanitary District’s Certificate of Merit for Continuous Compliance
2003: Waste Reduction Awards Program (California Integrated Waste Management
Board)
2003: TMMNA Environmental Award for Energy Conservation
2003: The Industrial Environmental Association and California Manufacturers & Technol-
ogy Association Award for corporate commitment to community and Environmen-
tal Responsibility
2004: Waste Reduction Awards Program (California Integrated Waste Management
Board)
2004: DNV Certification Inc. Environment Management System Certification (ISO
14001)
2005: Susanne Wilson’s Business Environmental Award for Pollution Prevention.
2005: Union Sanitary District’s Certificate of Merit for Continuous Compliance
2005: Waste Reduction Awards Program (California Integrated Waste Management
Board)
2005: Environmental Protection Agency’s Energy Star Partner of the Year
2006: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Energy Star Sustained Excellence 2006
Award
2006: Union Sanitary District’s Certificate of Merit for Consistent Compliance
Corporate Citizenship
1990: Industry Week magazine: One of 12 best manufacturing companies in the U.S.
1990: National Association of Suggestion Systems’ Group Winner Performance Excel-
lence Award
1991: California Cooperative Education Association’s Outstanding Cooperative Education
Award
1993: Alameda County Industry Education Council’s Outstanding Community Service
Project
1998: National Association of Manufacturers’ Award for Workforce Excellence
2001: East Bay Leadership Foundation’s Corporate Leader of the Year
2002: American Heart Association’s Heart Saver of the Year Award for use of a defibril-
lator
2002: California of Recognition for use of a defibrillator
2002: American Cancer Society’s Collaboration Award for Daffodil Days campaign par-
ticipation
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 Robert B. Austenfeld, Jr.: NUMMI—The Great Experiment
107 ――
1. NUMMI hasn’t had a layoff since starting.
2. NUMMI “builds cars that sell,” especially now since all their products are
relatively small and fuel-efficient.
3. NUMMI continues to succeed while Ford/GM are hurting.
4. The keys to its success are good labor relations and the TPS.
5. In 2002 during a new model year for the Corolla, NUMMI realized they
needed to educate new workers better and reeducate some of the older work-
ers. This apparently was about the elements of the TPS such as kanban,
kaizen, and jishuken. Note: see Losing the “TPS” edge in section 7.
6. This renewed education effort apparently has resulted in significant improve-
ments in production and safety.
7. NUMMI makes (at least at that time) 960 cars/day and 650 trucks/day. A car
comes on every 55 sec. and a truck every 88 sec. A car takes 6.5 hours to
make.
8. NUMMI is where the two largest carmakers can see what each other’s do-
ing.
9. NUMMI is an independent, private company. It doesn’t disclose its profits.
10. NUMMI is a place where GM and Toyota can learn from each other.
11. GM has learned a lot from NUMMI and this is reflected in recent recognized
improvements in its quality. The problem is it now has a bad reputation to
overcome.
12. NUMMI’s workers are dedicated to building great vehicles.
13. A new and better (for the workers) four-year contract was negotiated in Au-
gust 2005.
Appendix G (page 1 of 2)
Eighteen Points About “NUMMI Today”
(Summarized from NUMMI Plant a Model for Ailing Car Industry,
March, 2006)
Papers of the Research Society of Commerce and Economics, Vol. XXXXVII No. 2
108 ――
14. Supposedly NUMMI can’t build enough cars fast enough to meet demand.
15. NUMMI runs two shifts a day starting at 6 a.m.
16. The next big challenge will be in 2008 when both the Vibe and Corolla will
undergo “either a metamorphosis or some significant modifications.” The
focus will continue to be fuel efficiency.
17. Toyota and GM design the cars built at NUMMI.
18. NUMMI must work even harder than most auto manufacturers in the U.S.
since producing in California “costs 30 percent to 40 percent more.” This is
due to higher costs for such things as energy, real estate, labor, and workers’
compensation.
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Eighteen Points About “NUMMI Today” (continued)
